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has been enormously influential in various education and leadership 
contexts,	ranging	from	business	leadership	education	to	classroom	man-
agement.	But	the	more	we—the	authors	of	this	article—are	impressed	





far-reaching influence in the field of education as abovementioned but 
also	because	of	the	claim	that	it	was	inspired	by	Aristotle’s	virtue	ethics	














about	 the	 educator’s	EI	 impacting	 students’	 learning	 and	 emotional	
intelligence, a concern also identified by others (Jennings & Greenberg, 
2009).	Our	paper	advances	the	thesis	that	the	cultivation	of	educators’	
EI requires the practice of virtue ethics. We establish this thesis by first 
examining	the	limitations	of	the	Golemanian	EI,	and	then	by	showing	









Educators’ Emotions Are No Private Matter
	 Goleman	et	al.	(2002)	held	that	the	leader	acts	as	the	group’s	emo-




those under the influence and guidance of the leader/educator come into 
emotional	resonance	with	her	or	him:	“Whether	an	organization	fails	or	




the	 leader	whose	emotions	are	 contagious.	As	 this	 is	a	 crucial	point	













extent	 .	 .	 .	 Awareness	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 emotional	 contagion	may	
prove	useful	in	understanding	and	perhaps	advancing	various	areas	
of	interpersonal	communication	between	.	.	 .	teachers	and	students.	
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993, p. 99)
	 There	 is	 substantial	 evidence	 that	 people	 mimic	 speech,	 facial	
expressions,	mannerisms,	moods	and	emotions	of	others	(Chartrand,	






















influence group processes that are critical to group effectiveness (Cote 
& Sy, 2005). These findings have a major implication for the education 










et	 al.,	 2002,	 pp.	 48).	 For	many	 students,	 negative	 emotions	 impede	
learning while positive emotions support learning (Schutz & Perkrun, 
2007).	The	terms	negative	and	positive	refer	to	individual	experiences.	
Goleman	et	al.	suggested	that	the	leader’s	(in	our	context,	educator’s)	
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EI,	and	treat	 them	as	 individual	 traits.	Human	qualities	 in	 individu-
als	are	 invariably	and	 inextricably	 involved	 in	and	constructed	out	of	
long-term	 socialization	and	acculturation	 contexts	 and	processes	 that	


































purpose of fulfilling one’s telos (MacIntyre, 1999). 
	 So	 far	we	have	articulated	MacIntyre’s	 (1984)	 three-fold	schema	
regarding	the	individual’s	development	of	virtue	ethics.	That	is,	the	in-
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quiry	concerning:	(1)	who	I	am	now;	(2)	what	I	could	be;	(3)	and	what	is	
the	practice	of	ethics	that	will	move	me	from	where	I	am	today	towards	












she have courage? Does she follow the codified ethics of her practice? 











is not addressed by Goleman et al. (2002) to any significant extent. 
MacIntyre	 (1984),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 held	 that	 tradition,	 and	 the	
context	where	one	contributes	to	society	that	he	refers	to	as	practices,	
are particularly important in defining and supporting the develop-
ment	of	virtues.	MacIntyre	(1984)	argued	that	western	philosophical	
thought has attempted to replace telos that had been first derived 








silent; conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled. Instead 
one	must	simply	choose—between	parties,	classes,	nations	causes,	ide-
















A Telos and Unity of Life 





MacIntyre	 (1984)	stated:	“[T]he	unity	of	a	virtue	 in	someone’s	 life	 is	
intelligible	only	as	a	characteristic	of	a	unitary	life,	a	life	that	can	be	
conceived	and	evaluated	as	a	whole”	 (p,	205).	To	the	question	 ‘What	















key to leadership is emotional resonance that is values-driven, flexible, 
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open	and	honest,	and	connected	to	people	and	networks	(2002).	To	fur-
ther	elaborate	“emotional	resonance,”	McKee	et	al.	(2008)	stated:	

















and	 limitations.	When	 the	 connection	 is	made,	 one	 feels	 passionate	
about	the	possibilities	life	holds,	and	it	is	this	passion	that	carries	one	















Centrality of Practice and the Role of Tradition in Virtue Ethics 
 One’s telos or purpose maybe expressed through the specifics of a 
practice	and	it	is	within	a	practice	that	one	acts	virtuously	or	otherwise.	
According	to	MacIntyre	(1984),	a	practice	is	any	“coherent	and	complex	
Tom Culham & Heeson Bai 33
form	of	 socially	established	and	cooperative	human	activity	 through	
which	 goods	 internal	 to	 that	 form	 of	 activity	 are	 realized”	 (1984,	 p.	
186).	He	provides	a	wide	range	of	examples	including	football,	chess,	


























another;	however,	 the	goods	 that	 sustain	practices	are	 internal	 (the	
virtues)	and	the	goods	that	sustain	institutions	are	external	such	as	
reputation,	power,	wealth,	and	so	on.	Therefore,	those	working	within	
institutions are subjected to the corrupting influence of these same 
institutions	(MacIntyre,	1984).	MacIntyre	and	Dunne	(2002)	provided	







































been identified; however it is especially on the issue of tradition where 





(MacIntyre,	 1988).	 Virtue	 ethics	 views	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 member	
of	a	community,	a	citizen,	who	reasons	and	chooses	within	this	con-
text,	whereas	liberalism	sees	the	individual	as	someone	who	reasons	
and	makes	 choices	within	 the	 context	of	 the	needs	of	 the	 individual	
(MacIntyre,	1988).	In	addition,	liberalism	assumes	that	consumption	
(acquisitiveness)	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	market	economy,	which	takes	









and incompatible definitions of the good and accounts of the virtues, and 
therefore	there	can	be	no	shared	program	for	moral	education	within	
public	 institutions	 which	 must	 accommodate	 multiple	 perspectives	
(MacIntyre,	1999).	













Reasons of the Heart and Intrinsic Value
	 Vokey	(2005)	argued	it	is	important	that	people	learn	to	recognize	what	
a	truly	virtuous	person,	who	acts	based	on	intrinsic	moral	values,	would	





heart” (Vokey, 2001, pp. 257-309). Intrinsic value is defined as an event 
or	object	judged	to	be	intrinsically	good	for	its	own	sake	as	opposed	to	for	
the	sake	of	human	desires	or	interests	(Vokey,	2005).	




















rely	 on	 human	 experience	 to	 determine	 intrinsic	 value.	 This	 ability	
can	be	developed	in	the	individual	to	provide	a	cognitional	capability	
to	apprehend	one’s	telos	and	the	intrinsic	good.	Our	consideration	of	
Golemanian	 concept	 of	 telos	 revealed	an	 individually	driven	process	








may	 provide	 some	 clarity	 to	Goleman’s	 et	 al.	 (2002)	 process.	 Vokey	






as	 separate.	Contemplation	 provides	 individuals,	 regardless	 of	 their	
worldviews	and	traditions	with	the	ability	to	increase	their	perception	
of	nondual	and	nondiscursive	states	of	mind	where	they	may	become	











this is not without empirical foundation. Research shows that contem-
plative	practices	support	EI	by	increasing	awareness	of	one’s	internal	
experience, promotion of reflection, self-regulation, and caring for others, 
and	results	in	a	mental	set	that	is	associated	with	effective	classroom	
teaching and facilitation (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). 
	 In	our	view,	the	above	observations	do	much	to	address	MacIntyre’s	
concern (1999, MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) that virtue ethics cannot be 
taught	in	a	public	education	setting	since	apprehension	of	intrinsic	good	
through	reasons	of	the	heart	is	available	to	anyone,	regardless	of	tradi-















al. (2002) EI thesis. Influences that the leader’s emotions have on others 
work	just	as	ethically	as	unethically.
	 On	 this	matter,	MacIntyre	 (1984)	 held	 that	 humans	who	 are	 in	
relationships	uninformed	by	morality	treat	the	other	as	a	means	to	his	
or	her	ends	wherein	the	other	is	seen	as	an	instrument.	Those	in	power	
may apply whatever influences are necessary to achieve through that 
person.	On	 the	 other	hand,	a	person	guided	by	morality	 of	 intrinsic	














































a moral practice. This could result in a significant shift in thinking. 
Yet	the	present	reality	has	not	made	this	shift.	MacIntyre	(1984)	is	
right	in	observing	that,	for	much	of	the	twentieth	century,	managers	
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and	educators	viewed	those	under	them	instrumentally.	He	consid-
ered	educators	and	managers	 to	 fall	 into	a	 character	 category	 that	
exemplifies the fundamental values of an era (1984): for our era, it is 
instrumentalism.	For	example,	a	contemporary	educator	may	typically	
be	concerned	with	the	well-being	of	students	only	in	as	much	as	their	
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develop	their	EI.	Further,	with	the	exception	of	concerns	regarding	the	
role	of	a	tradition,	we	have	argued	that	the	development	of	EI	should	be	
a moral practice as defined by MacIntyre (1984). Thus, those develop-














benefit of a positive supportive community that help people make positive 





	 Both	MacIntyre	 (1984)	 and	Goleman	 et	 al.	 (2002)	 contemplated	
















• Clearly define its purpose consistent with virtue ethics;









 In sum, virtue ethics and EI appear to bear significant similarities. 





might look like, but much needs to be done to fill in the details. 
Notes



































the	 possibility	 that	 a	 calculated	 Machiavellian	 personality	 can	 be	 deemed	
emotionally	intelligent.	From	an	educational	perspective,	the	paucity	of	solid	






cognitive neuroscience findings” and should not be applied in education (2006 
p.247).	In	response	empirical	research	is	cited	to	refute	the	neuroscience	and	
moral criticisms (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006), however we 
believe	that	philosophic	concerns	regarding	the	lack	of	moral	depth	of	EI	were	
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